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The	CFA	Franc:	French	Monetary	Imperialism	in
Africa
Ndongo	Samba	Sylla	argues	that	the	CFA	franc	–	officially	created	on	26	December	1945	by	a	decree	of	General
de	Gaulle	–	used	across	much	of	Africa	today	is	a	colonial	relic.	For	those	hoping	to	export	competitive	products,
obtain	affordable	credit,	work	for	the	integration	of	continental	trade,	or	fight	for	an	Africa	free	from	imperialist
control,	the	CFA	franc	is	an	anachronism	demanding	orderly	and	methodical	elimination.
On	11	August	2015,	speaking	at	the	celebrations	marking	the	55th	anniversary	of	the	independence	of	Chad,
President	Idriss	Deby	declared,	‘we	must	have	the	courage	to	say	there	is	a	cord	preventing	development	in
Africa	that	must	be	severed.’	The	‘cord’	he	was	referring	to	is	now	over	71	years	old.	It	is	known	by	the	acronym
‘CFA	franc’.
The	pillars	of	the	CFA	franc
Like	other	colonial	empires	–	the	UK,	with	its	sterling	zone;	or	Portugal,	with	its	escudo	zone,	France	had	its	franc
zone.	The	CFA	franc	–	orginally	the	French	African	Colonial	franc	–	was	officially	created	on	26	December	1945
by	a	decree	of	General	de	Gaulle.	It	is	a	colonial	currency,	born	of	France’s	need	to	foster	economic	integration
among	the	colonies	under	its	administration,	and	thus	control	their	resources,	economic	structures	and	political
systems.
Image:	Antonio	Medina	via	The	Corner	EU	(http://bit.ly/2slfjZu)
Post-independence	the	CFA	franc	was	redesignated:	for	the	eight	members	of	the	West	African	Economic	and
Monetary	Union	(WAEMU)	–	Benin,	Burkina	Faso,	Côte	d’Ivoire,	Guinea-Bissau,	Mali,	Niger,	Senegal	and	Togo	–
it	became	the	African	Financial	Community	franc;	for	the	six	members	of	the	Central	African	Economic	and
Monetary	Community	(CAEMC)	–	Cameroon,	Central	African	Republic,	Republic	of	the	Congo,	Gabon,	Equatorial
Guinea	and	Chad	–	the	Central	African	Financial	Cooperation	franc.	The	two	zones	possess	economies	of	equal
size	(each	representing	11	per	cent	of	GDP	in	sub-Saharan	Africa).	The	two	currencies,	however,	are	not	inter-
convertible.
As	established	by	the	monetary	accords	between	African	nations	and	France,	the	CFA	franc	has	four	main	pillars:
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Firstly,	a	fixed	rate	of	exchange	with	the	euro	(and	previously	the	French	franc)	set	at	1	euro	=	655.957	CFA
francs.	Secondly,	a	French	guarantee	of	the	unlimited	convertibility	of	CFA	francs	into	euros.	Thirdly,	a
centralisation	of	foreign	exchange	reserves.	Since	2005,	the	two	central	banks	–	the	Central	Bank	of	West	African
States	(BCEAO)	and	the	Bank	of	Central	African	States	(BEAC)	–	have	been	required	to	deposit	50	per	cent	of
their	foreign	exchange	reserves	in	a	special	French	Treasury	‘operating	account’.	Immediately	following
independence,	this	figure	stood	at	100	per	cent	(and	from	1973	to	2005,	at	65	per	cent).
This	arrangement	is	a	quid	pro	quo	for	the	French	‘guarantee’	of	convertibility.	The	accords	stipulate	that	foreign
exchange	reserves	must	exceed	money	in	circulation	by	a	margin	of	20	per	cent.	Before	the	fall	in	oil	prices,	the
money	supply	coverage	rate	(the	ratio	of	foreign	exchange	reserves	to	money	in	circulation)	consistently
approached	100	per	cent,	implying	in	theory	that	Africans	could	dispense	with	the	French	‘guarantee’.	The	final
pillar	of	the	CFA	franc,	is	the	principle	of	free	capital	transfer	within	the	franc	zone.
The	CFA	franc:	for	and	against
Despite	its	exceptional	longevity,	the	CFA	franc	by	no	means	enjoys	unanimous	support	among	African
economists	and	intellectuals.	Its	critics	base	their	analysis	on	three	separate	arguments.	Firstly,	they	condemn
the	absence	of	monetary	sovereignty.	France	holds	a	de	facto	veto	on	the	boards	of	the	two	central	banks	within
the	CFA	franc	zone.	Since	the	reform	of	the	BCEAO	in	2010,	the	conduct	of	monetary	policy	has	been	assigned
to	a	monetary	policy	committee.	The	French	representative	is	a	voting	member	of	this	committee,	while	the
president	of	the	WAEMU	Commission	attends	only	in	an	advisory	capacity.	Given	the	fixed	rate	of	exchange
between	the	CFA	franc	and	the	euro,	the	monetary	and	exchange	rate	policies	of	the	franc	zone	nations	are	also
dictated	by	the	European	Central	Bank,	whose	monetary	orthodoxy	entails	an	anti-inflation	bias	detrimental	to
growth.
Secondly,	they	focus	on	the	economic	impact	of	the	CFA	franc,	construed	as	a	neocolonial	device	that	continues
to	destroy	any	prospect	of	economic	development	in	user	nations.	According	to	this	perspective,	the	CFA	franc	is
a	barrier	to	industrialisation	and	structural	transformation,	serving	neither	to	stimulate	trade	integration	between
user	nations,	nor	boost	bank	lending	to	their	economies.	The	credit-to-GDP	ratio	stands	around	25%	for	the
WAEMU	zone,	and	13%	for	the	CAEMC	zone,	but	averages	60%+	for	sub-Saharan	Africa,	and	100%+	for	South
Africa	etc.	The	CFA	franc	also	encourages	massive	capital	outflows.	In	brief,	membership	of	the	franc	zone	is
synonymous	with	poverty	and	under-employment,	as	evidenced	by	the	fact	that	11	of	its	15	adherents	are
classed	as	Least	Developed	Countries	(LDCs),	while	the	remainder	(Côte	d’Ivoire,	Cameroon,	Congo,	Gabon)
have	all	experienced	real-term	economic	decline.
Finally,	they	maintain	that	membership	of	the	franc	zone	is	inimical	to	the	advance	of	democracy.	To	uphold	the
CFA	franc,	it	is	argued,	France	has	never	hesitated	to	jettison	heads	of	state	tempted	to	withdraw	from	the
system.	Most	were	removed	from	office	or	killed	in	favour	of	more	compliant	leaders	who	cling	to	power	come	hell
or	high	water,	as	shown	by	the	CAEMC	nations	and	Togo.	Economic	development	is	impossible	in	such
circumstances,	as	is	the	creation	of	a	political	system	that	meets	the	preoccupations	of	the	majority	of	citizens.
For	its	partisans,	in	contrast,	the	underlying	logic	of	the	CFA	franc	lies	not	in	neocolonialism,	but	in	monetary
cooperation.	The	under-development	of	the	franc	zone	nations	is	attributed	to	factors	independent	of	their
monetary	and	exchange	policies,	in	particular	to	their	political	instability	and	the	poor	economic	policies	of	their
leaders.
The	CFA	franc	is	characterised	as	a	credible	and	stable	currency,	a	significant	virtue	given	the	experience	of
most	currency-issuing	African	nations.	This	counter-argument	is,	however,	flawed:	experience	shows	that	nations
like	Morocco,	Tunisia	and	Algeria,	which	post	independence	withdrew	from	the	franc	zone	and	mint	their	own
currency,	are	stronger	economically	than	any	user	of	the	CFA	franc.
It	is	also	claimed	that	the	CFA	franc	has	allowed	inflation	to	be	pegged	at	a	rate	considerably	lower	than	the
African	average.	For	its	critics,	however,	the	counterpart	of	this	low	inflation	rate	is	weak	economic	growth	and
the	creation	of	fewer	jobs.	Not	to	mention	that	this	low	average	inflation	rate	does	not	prevent	cities	like	Dakar
from	ranking	among	the	most	‘expensive’	in	the	world.
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In	fact,	the	terms	of	the	debate	are	quite	simple.	The	CFA	franc	is	a	good	currency	for	those	who	benefit	from	it:
the	major	French	and	overseas	corporations,	the	executives	of	the	zone’s	central	banks,	the	elites	wishing	to
repatriate	wealth	acquired	legally	or	otherwise,	heads	of	state	unwilling	to	upset	France	etc.	But	for	those	hoping
to	export	competitive	products,	obtain	affordable	credit,	find	work,	work	for	the	integration	of	continental	trade,	or
fight	for	an	Africa	free	from	colonial	relics,	the	CFA	franc	is	an	anachronism	demanding	orderly	and	methodical
elimination.
From	forbidden	topic	to	emerging	social	movement
In	October	2016,	a	group	of	African	and	European	economists	published	a	book	entitled	[in	translation]	Liberate
Africa	from	Monetary	Slavery:	Who	Profits	from	the	CFA	Franc?	The	date	was	not	selected	at	random;	it
coincided	with	a	meeting	of	the	franc	zone’s	finance	ministers,	central	bank	governors	and	regional	institutions.	In
the	wake	of	the	public	debate	sparked	by	the	book,	people	are	beginning	to	speak	out.
France	maintains	the	position	that	the	CFA	franc	is	an	‘African	currency’,	existing	only	as	a	support	to	Africans,
who	retain	their	‘sovereignty’.	Some	heads	of	state,	like	Alassane	Ouattara	in	Côte	d’Ivoire	and	Macky	Sall	in
Senegal	take	the	same	line.	Unlike	Idriss	Déby,	Macky	Sall	describes	the	CFA	franc	as	‘a	currency	worth
keeping’.	Ouattara	goes	further,	insisting	that	the	currency	is	a	matter	for	experts	and	thus	not	a	subject	for
democratic	debate.	From	this	standpoint,	any	critic	of	the	CFA	franc	must	by	definition	know	nothing	about	it.
Yet,	alongside	radical	economists	and	intellectuals,	the	critics	of	the	CFA	franc	also	include	former	international
officials	like	Togo’s	Kako	Nubukpo	(ex-BCEAO),	Senegal’s	Sanou	Mbaye	(ex-African	Development	Bank,	and
Guinea-Bissau’s	Carlos	Lopez	(ex-UN	Economic	Commission	for	Africa),	as	well	as	African	bankers	like	Henri-
Claude	Oyima	(President-Director	General	of	BGFI	Bank).
From	a	taboo	subject	raised	only	by	a	handful	of	African	intellectuals	and	politicians,	the	CFA	franc	debate	is
starting	to	enter	day-to-day	conversation	and	to	attract	the	attention	of	activists.	A	social	movement	is	developing
to	demand	the	joint	withdrawal	of	African	nations	from	the	CFA	franc.	On	7	January	2017,	on	the	initiative	of	‘SOS
Pan-Africa’	(‘Urgences	Panafricanistes’),	an	NGO	set	up	and	run	by	the	activist	Kemi	Séba,	anti-CFA
demonstrations	were	organised	in	several	African	and	European	cities,	and	in	Haïti.	The	mobilisations	varied	in
size	according	to	country,	bringing	together	intellectuals,	pan-Africanist	and	anti-globalisation	activists	and	others.
SOS	Pan-Africa	has	since	issued	a	symbolic	appeal	for	Africans	to	boycott	French	products.
The	current	alternative	to	the	CFA	franc	in	West	Africa	is	the	joint	currency	planned	for	members	of	the	Economic
Community	of	West	African	States	(ECOWAS).	The	new	currency	was	due	to	enter	circulation	in	2015,	but	this
has	since	been	deferred	until	2020.	The	new	deadline	may	or	may	not	be	met,	but	one	thing	seems	increasingly
clear:	the	CFA	franc	no	longer	has	a	future.
This	article	was	first	published	on	the	Review	of	the	African	Political	Economy	(ROAPE)	blog.
Ndongo	Samba	Sylla	(@nssylla)	is		Research	and	Programme	Manager	for	the	Rosa	Luxemburg	Foundation.
He	is	the	editor	and	author	of	a	number	of	books	including	The	Fair	Trade	Scandal.
	
The	views	expressed	in	this	post	are	those	of	the	author	and	in	no	way	reflect	those	of	the	Africa	at	LSE
blog	or	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.
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